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We present a novel and tractable model of long-term sovereign debt. We make two sets
of contributions. First, on the substantive side, using Argentina as a test case we show
that unlike one-period debt models, our model of long-term sovereign debt is capable of
accounting for the average spread, the average default frequency, and the average debt-to-
output ratio of Argentina over the 1991-2001 period without any deterioration in the model’s
ability to account for Argentina’s cyclical facts. Using our calibrated model we determine
what Argentina’s debt, default frequency and welfare would have been if Argentina had
issued only short-term debt. Second, on the methodological side, we advance the theory
of sovereign debt begun in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) by establishing the existence of an
equilibrium pricing function for long-term sovereign debt and by providing a fairly complete
set of characterization results regarding equilibrium default and borrowing behavior. In
addition, we identify and solve a computational problem associated with pricing long-term
unsecured debt that stems from nonconvexities introduced by the possibility of default.1 Introduction
We study an equilibrium model of unsecured debt and default in which borrowers issue long-
term debt. The existing literature on this subject – both the consumer debt and sovereign
debt parts – has mostly considered one-period debt. In reality, both consumers and countries
can and do borrow long term. The maturity structure we introduce in this paper brings
equilibrium models of unsecured debt and default closer to the maturity structures observed
in the real world.
Our motivation for this extension derives from a deﬁciency of one-period unsecured debt
models, a deﬁciency most clearly evident in the extant quantitative sovereign-debt litera-
ture. This literature has achieved notable success in accounting for the key cyclical patterns
in output, consumption, trade balance, and interest rates for emerging market economies
that borrow in international credit markets. As demonstrated in Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006) and Arellano (2008), a model of unsecured sovereign debt of the type developed in
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) can explain why such emerging market economies have con-
sumption volatility almost as high as output volatility and why their trade balance moves
countercyclically – two facts that appear anomalous relative to the experience of developed
economies (Neumeyer and Perri (2005)). However, these eﬀorts also have some notable
misses. Although they succeed in accounting for second moments (cyclical patterns), they
do not account for ﬁrst moments of the key variables; in particular, they do not account for
the generally high level of indebtedness of emerging market economies or the high spreads
on their sovereign debt.
We make two contributions in this paper, one substantive and the other methodological. The
substantive contribution is to show, using Argentina as a test case, that incorporating long-
term bonds of median maturity observed in the data allows the model to match the average
debt and spread levels for Argentina (over the 1991-2001 period). Furthermore, although
no attempt is made to target cyclical properties of the Argentine data, the model has the
same level of success in accounting for the cyclical facts as Arellano (2008) and Aguiar and
1Gopinath (2006). We show that it is the lengthened maturity that makes this improvement
in model performance possible: speciﬁcally, a one-period debt model cannot match average
spreads and debt levels without generating counterfactually high volatility of consumption
and trade balance.
There is a simple intuition for our ﬁndings. With the long-maturity bond, ﬂuctuations in
the default spread caused by ﬂuctuations in output do not strongly constrain the ability
of the sovereign to service debt. Even if the debt level is very high (and it is about 100
percent of quarterly output in the case of Argentina in the 1990s), not all of this debt is
due for repayment in any given period. Thus, the amount of new debt that needs to be
issued at potentially high interest rates is relatively small. In contrast, when spreads rise
on one-period debt either very large amounts of new debt at high interest rates have to
be issued – implying low level of consumption next period – or consumption needs to be
drastically reduced in the current period. In this situation the sovereign is willing to acquire
the observed high level of debt only if it is very impatient and faces a very high cost of
default. However, the implied equilibrium volatility of consumption is almost twice as high,
and that of the trade balance is almost four times as high, compared to the data.
In contrast, long-term debt gives the sovereign both the opportunity and the incentive to
acquire substantial amounts of debt. Because all debt does not have to be reﬁnanced each
period, the incentive to default on additional unit of long-term debt is much lower relative to
short-term debt and this reduces the elasticity of spreads with respect to debt. Thus, with
long-term debt, the sovereign has the opportunity to borrow additional amounts at interest
rates that rise relatively slowly with debt. In addition, the sovereign has the incentive to
acquire more debt as well because the sovereign does not internalize the decline in the value
of outstanding debt caused by additional borrowing. This is the well-known debt-dilution
eﬀect. Once debt has been issued, the decline in its value from additional borrowing in the
future is of no concern to the sovereign. In contrast, with one-period debt, the sovereign
recognizes that additional debt lowers the price (raises the interest rate) on all debt issued.
Both factors – the low elasticity of spreads as well as the debt-dilution eﬀect – contributes
2the sovereign’s acquiring a large amount of debt. With one-period debt, these contributing
factors are absent.
Our quantitative results also shed light on an important welfare issue. Given the ease
of rolling over (or servicing) long-term debt, a common intuition in the literature is that
borrowing long-term is beneﬁcial to a sovereign facing default risk. But when we compare the
welfare implications of long-term versus short-term debt for parameter values that account
for average Argentine debt and spreads, we ﬁnd that Argentina is better oﬀ with short-term
debt. The main reason is that, keeping all model parameters constant (other than maturity),
the sovereign borrows much more and defaults much more frequently with long-term bonds.
This is due to the two reasons noted above: the low elasticity of spreads with respect to debt
and the incentive to acquire debt because of the debt-dilution eﬀect. Although we might
expect this decrease in welfare to be counterbalanced by the ease of rolling over long-term
debt, this eﬀect does not turn out to be dominant with our calibrated parameters, mainly
because, with short-term debt, the country never ends up borrowing high enough (and have
high spreads) to make this repayment ﬂexibility aﬀorded by long-term debt a valuable option.
We suspect that long-term debt might look attractive if we take into account the considerable
transactions costs of participating in the international capital market or where there are
issues of multiple equilibria and long-term debt might prevent the “run” equilibrium where
each small foreign lender refuses to issue new debt because each expects the other lenders to
refuse as well (as in Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2007) and Cole and Kehoe (2000)).
Turning next to our methodological contributions, there are two. Long-term debt introduces
new theoretical and computational issues, which we address. On the theoretical side, the
pricing of long-term debt depends not only on the probability of default in the following
period but also on the borrowing behavior of the sovereign in the event of repayment. This
is diﬀerent from the case of one-period debt where in the event of repayment the pay-oﬀ
is certain and given. Thus it is not apparent that the price of debt is decreasing in the
amount of debt issued. We establish that the equilibrium pricing function for long-term
debt must have this property. In the process, we characterize the sovereign’s default and
3borrowing behavior with respect to the level of debt. These characterization results provide
intuition on how a model with long-term debt works. We also establish the existence of an
equilibrium pricing function, extending the existence result for one-period debt in Chatterjee
et al. (2007) to the case of long-term debt with a constant risk-free rate.1
On the computational side there are new issues that also stem from the fact that the price
of debt depends on the sovereign’s borrowing behavior in the event of repayment. Although
our way of modeling long-term debt keeps the state space low, the nonconvexities introduced
by the possibility of default can result in cycles in the sovereign’s borrowing behavior and
the model solution need not converge with standard grid-based methods. This problem is
solved in a manner explained in the computation section of the paper. The solution makes
use of some additional characterization results provided in the theoretical section. Also, we
describe a novel algorithm for computing the optimal borrowing decision rule in the presence
of nonconvexities.
There is a related literature on sovereign debt that attempts to go beyond one-period
debt. Hatchondo and Martinez (2008) introduce long-duration bonds into an Arellano-style
sovereign debt model. Their motivation is to improve upon the volatility of spreads predicted
by Arellano, which is arguably too low relative to the data. In contrast, the quantitative
focus of our paper is on ﬁrst moments of debt and spreads. There is also a diﬀerence in
methodology. As we explain later in the paper, lengthening the maturity of bonds in a stan-
dard way leads to a computationally intractable model. Therefore, some “trick” is needed to
analyze long-term bonds. The strategy relies on making the long-term bond “memoryless”
so that it is not necessary to keep track of the date-of-issue of the bond. Our strategy is more
general and easier to apply to the data than the one applied in Hatchondo and Martinez.
Bi (2006) focuses on maturity choice in a model of one- and two-period debt. Arellano and
Ramnarayan (2008) also focus on maturity choice but use the long-duration model proposed
1Consumer debt is not a focus of this paper. It is worth noting, however, that the model of unsecured
consumer debt introduced in Athreya (2002) and extended and analyzed further in Chatterjee et al. (2007),
Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007), and others, bears a strong resemblance to models of sovereign debt a
la Eaton and Gersovitz.
4in Hatchondo and Martinez.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we brieﬂy discuss why incorporating long-
term debt in the standard way into models of unsecured debt can lead to computationally
intractable models and then describe our strategy for circumventing this problem. In section
3 we introduce the sovereign debt environment we analyze. In section 4 we present char-
acterization results for the equilibrium pricing function and the default and debt decision
rules. These results provide intuition on the working of the model and aid in its computa-
tion. Section 5 discusses computational issues. As mentioned above, grid-based algorithms
for computing equilibrium models of default encounter convergence problems. These diﬃ-
culties, and the way they are addressed in this paper, are explained in section 5. Section
6 presents the results of incorporating long-term debt for Argentina and explains how in-
corporating long-term debt helps improves the ability of this class of models to explain the
emerging market facts. Section 7 concludes.
2 Modeling Long-Term Debt
A natural way to introduce long-term debt is to assume that debt issued in period t is due
for repayment in period t + T. Since new debt can be issued each period, this means that
the issuer’s state vector contains the vector (b0,b1,b2,...,bT−1) where bτ is the quantity of
bonds due for repayment τ periods in the future. Then, the probability of default on a bond
due for repayment in period τ is the sum of the probability of default in the current period
plus the probability of repayment in the current period but default in the next period plus
the probability of repayment in the next two periods followed by default in the third period
and so on all the way to period τ in the future. Even for modest values of T (such as 3
or 4), these calculations can become quite demanding because we will have at least T state
variables, each of which can potentially take many, many values.
Our approach is to simplify the maturity structure of debt in a way that calculation of
default probabilities from the individual’s decision problem becomes easier. We analyze
5long-term debt contracts that mature probabilistically. Speciﬁcally, each unit of outstanding
debt matures next period with probability λ. If the unit does not mature – which happens
with probability 1 − λ – it gives out a coupon payment z. Observe that if λ = 1, then
the bond is a one-period discount bond, and if z > 0 and λ = 0 then the bond is a consol
promising to pay z units each period. For intermediate values of λ, we have a bond that
matures, on average, in 1/λ periods.
Why is this probabilistic maturity structure easier to analyze? The beneﬁt comes from
the “memory-less” nature of the bond. Going forward, a unit bond of type (z,λ) issued
k ≥ 1 periods in the past has exactly the same payoﬀ structure as another (z,λ) unit bond
issued k0 > k periods in the past. This means we can aggregate all outstanding (z,λ)
unit bonds regardless of the date of issue and thereby cut down on the number of state
variables relevant to the individual’s decision problem. This reduction in turn reduces the
computational burden of computing default probabilities.
In what follows we will assume that unit bonds are inﬁnitesimally small – meaning that if
b unit bonds of type (z,λ) are outstanding at the start of next period, the issuer’s coupon
obligations next period will be z ·(1−λ)b for sure and her payment-of-principal obligations
will be λb for sure. And if no new bonds are issued or no outstanding bonds redeemed next
period, (1 − λ)b unit bonds will be outstanding for sure at the start of the following period.
Hatchondo and Martinez (2008) use a similar trick of rendering outstanding obligations
“memoryless” in order to analyze sovereign debt that lasts more than one (model) period.
In their setup all bonds last forever (consols) but each pays a geometrically declining sequence
of coupon payments. Thus, a bond issued in the current period promises to pay the sequence
{1,δ,δ2,δ3,...}. One period later, the promised sequence of payments is {δ,δ2,δ3,δ4,...},
which is no diﬀerent than the promised sequence on δ units of the bond issued last period.
It is as if (1 − δ) fraction of outstanding bonds mature each period and there is a coupon
payment of 1 on every outstanding bond, including the ones that mature.
63 Environment
3.1 Preferences and Endowments
Time is discrete and denoted t ∈ {0,1,2,...}. The sovereign receives a strictly positive endow-
ment yt each period. The stochastic evolution of yt is governed by a ﬁnite-state Markov chain
with state space Y ⊂ R++ and transition law Pr{yt+1 = y0|yt = y} = F(y,y0), yand y0 ∈ Y .
The sovereign maximizes expected utility over consumption sequences, where the utility from




tu(ct − mt), β < 0 (1)
The momentary utility function u(·) : [0,∞) → R is continuous, strictly increasing, and
strictly concave. The term mt ∈ M = [0, ¯ m] is a minimum consumption requirement drawn
independently each period from a probability distribution with continuous cdf G(m).
The presence of the minimum consumption shock deserves some comment. The shock is
included to make robust computation of the model possible. It is important that the shock
be drawn from a continuous distribution and that it be i.i.d. The role played by these two
assumptions in the computation of the equilibrium is discussed later. In the quantitative
application, volatility of m is taken as low as possible so that it does not aﬀect quantitative
results signiﬁcantly, but convergence of the model solution is ensured. It is worth pointing out
that the minimum consumption requirement setup is isomorphic to a setup where there is no
minimum consumption requirement but there are temporary i.i.d. shocks to endowments.2
2This is the environment analyzed in Chatterjee et al. (2007); so the theoretical results on long-term
debt reported later in the paper apply to that (consumer debt) environment as well.
73.2 Option to Default and the Market Arrangement
The sovereign can borrow in the international credit market and has the option to default on
a loan. If the sovereign defaults, it cannot borrow in the period of default and, in the future,
it is excluded from the international credit market for a random length of time. Speciﬁcally,
upon default the sovereign is permitted to borrow in the future with probability 0 < ξ < 1
and once it is permitted to borrow it can borrow in all subsequent periods until it defaults
again. During the periods in which the sovereign is excluded from borrowing – including the
period of default – it loses some amount φ(y) > 0 of its output y. In addition, in the period
of default, the sovereign’s minimum consumption requirement rises to its maximum value
¯ m. We will assume that y −φ(y)− ¯ m > 0 for all y, which ensures that discretionary output
(total output less minimum consumption) is always strictly positive under all circumstances.
There is a single type of bond of type (z,λ) available in this economy. We will assume
that lenders are risk-neutral and the market for sovereign debt is competitive. The unit
price of a bond of size b is given by q(y,b). Note that the unit price does not depend
on the transitory shock m because knowledge of current period m does not help predict
either m or y in the future and, therefore, does not inform the likelihood of future default.
We will assume that the sovereign can choose the size of her bond issues from a ﬁnite set
B = {bI,bI−1,...b2,b1,0}, where bI < bI−1 < ... < b2 < b1 < 0.3 As is customary in this
literature, we will view borrowing as negative assets. Thus when we refer to the level of
bonds or debt, b, it should be understood that b is a negative number.
3.3 Decision Problem
Consider the decision problem of a sovereign with b ∈ B of type (z,λ) bonds outstanding,
endowment y, and minimum consumption requirement m. Because the sovereign is indebted,
it has the option to default. Denote the sovereign’s lifetime utility conditional on repayment,
3For simplicity, we do not allow the sovereign to save. This restriction is not important for the theory,
and in the application, the no-savings constraint is never binding.
8i.e. maintaining access to international credit markets, by the function V (y,m,b) : Y ×
M × B → R and its lifetime utility conditional on being excluded from international credit
markets by the function W(y,m) : Y × M → R.
Then:
W(y,m) = u(c − m) + β{[1 − ξ]E(y0 m0)|yW(y
0,m




0 ≤ c ≤ y − φ(y)
The sovereign’s lifetime utility under exclusion reﬂects the possibility that it may be let back
into the credit market with probability ξ. If it is not let back, its situation next period will
be the same as it is in the current period under exclusion – it loses φ(y) of its output and can
expect to be let back into the credit market next period with probability ξ. In the period
of default, the sovereign’s lifetime utility is W(y, ¯ m). Since u(.) is strictly increasing, it is
optimal for a sovereign who defaults or is excluded from international markets due to a prior
default to simply consume all its available output.
And
V (y,m,b) = max




0, ¯ m)} (3)
s.t.
0 ≤ c ≤ y + [λ + [1 − λ]z]b − q(y,b
0)[b
0 − [1 − λ]b]
The above implicitly assumes that the budget set under repayment is nonempty, meaning
there is at least one choice of b0 that leads to nonnegative discretionary consumption. But it is
possible that (y,b,m) is such that all choices of b0 lead to negative discretionary consumption.
In this case, repayment is simply not an option and the sovereign must default. But in order
to ensure that V (.) is deﬁned over the entire domain, we will assume that if the budget set
9is empty, then
V (y,m,b) = u(0) + β{[1 − ξ]E(y0 m0)|yW(y
0,m
0) + ξE(y0 m0)|yV (y
0,m
0,0)} (4)
Observe that in this deﬁnition the future looks exactly the same as it does under default.
Thus, with this deﬁnition it is strictly optimal for the sovereign to choose default over
“repayment” when the budget set under repayment is empty. This is so because the sovereign
can get strictly positive consumption by declaring default – recall that by assumption y −
φ(y) − ¯ m > 0.
We will assume that if the sovereign is indiﬀerent between repayment and default, it repays.
Hence, the country will default on debt b if and only if W(y, ¯ m) > V (y,m,b).
This decision problem implies a default decision rule d(y,m,b), where d = 1 implies default
and d = 0 implies repayment, and, conditional on repayment, a debt choice rule a(y,m,b).
3.4 Equilibrium
The world one-period risk-free rate rf is taken as exogenous. Given a competitive market
in sovereign debt, the unit price of a bond of size b – q(y,b0) – must be consistent with zero
proﬁts adjusting for the probability of default. That is:
q(y,b










Observe that in the future states in which the sovereign defaults, the creditors get nothing.
In the absence of default, the creditors get λ, which is the fraction of the unit bond that
matures next period, and on the remaining fraction, the creditors get the coupon payment
z. In addition, the fraction that does not mature will have some value next period that
depends on the sovereign’s endowment and borrowing next period.
104 Characterization of Equilibrium
In this section we characterize and prove the existence of an equilibrium. The characteriza-
tion results provide intuition on the nature of the model and aid in the computation of the
equilibrium. They are all in the nature of monotonicity results.
Proposition 1 : There exist unique continuous and bounded functions W(y,m) and
V (y,m,b) that solve the functional equations (2)-(4). In the region of the domain where
repayment is feasible, V (y,m,b) is strictly increasing in b and strictly decreasing in m.
Proof : The existence of unique, continuous and bounded solutions to the functional equa-
tions follow from standard contraction mapping arguments that will not be repeated here.
With regard to the monotonicity of V , observe that if m0 < m1, then every b0 that is
feasible under (y,m1,b) is also feasible under (y,m0,b) and yields strictly higher discretionary
consumption. Since the value of m does not aﬀect the probability distribution of (y0,m0), it
follows that V (y,m0,b) > V (y,m1,b).
Next, observe that if b0 < b1, then for every b0 ∈ B and every y ∈ Y we have [λ+[1−λ]z]b0+
q(y,b0)[1−λ]b0 < [λ+[1−λ]z]b1+q(y,b0)[1−λ]b1. This follows because [λ+[1−λ]z] > 0 and
q(y,b0) ≥ 0. Hence, any b0 that is feasible under (y,m,b0) is also feasible under (y,m,b1) and
aﬀords strictly greater discretionary consumption. Therefore, V (y,m,b0) < V (y,m,b1). 
The next proposition establishes that default is at least as likely under a higher debt level
as under a lower debt level.
Proposition 2 : If b0 < b1, then d(y,m,b0) ≥ d(y,m,b1).
Proof : Suppose, to get a contradiction, that d(y,m,b0) < d(y,m,b1). Then it must be the
case that d(y,m,b0) = 0 and d(y,m,b1) = 1. The former implies that V (y,m,b0) ≥ W(y, ¯ m)
and the latter implies W(y, ¯ m) > V (y,m,b1). Then, we must have V (y,m,b0) > V (y,m,b1).
But this contradicts Proposition 1. Hence, d(y,m,b0) ≥ d(y,m,b1). 
One would expect Proposition 2 to imply that the equilibrium pricing function, q(y,b0), is
increasing in b0 (or, equivalently, that the equilibrium default premium is increasing in the
11level of indebtedness). In the case of one-period bonds this is indeed true. If z = 0 and λ = 1,
the equilibrium pricing equation (5) reduces to q0,1(y,b0) = E(y0 m0)|y[1−d(y0,m0,b0)]/[1+rf],
which is increasing by Proposition 2. But when λ < 1 (bonds have maturity longer than
1 period), the payoﬀ under repayment depends on the value of the outstanding bonds next
period, which, in turn, depends on the sovereign’s output next period and the sovereign’s
borrowing decision next period. The following Proposition establishes that if the decision
rule a(y,m,b) is increasing in b, then q(y,b0) is increasing in b0.
Proposition 3 : Suppose λ ∈ [0,1). If a(y,m,b) is increasing in b, then the equilibrium
pricing equation (5) implies that q(y,b0) is increasing in b0.
Proof : Let d∗(y,m,b) and a∗(y,m,b) be the equilibrium decision rules corresponding to the













Then the equilibrium pricing function q∗(y,b0) solves the equation q∗(y,b0) = T(q∗)(y,b0).
Next, we will show that the operator T is a contraction mapping. Observe that (i) q(y,b0) ≥
q(y,b0) implies T(q1) ≥ T(q0) and (ii) for any positive constant θ and any q(y,b0), T(q+θ) ≤
T(q)+θ[1−λ]/[1+rf] (this follows because 1−d∗(y0,m0,b0) ≤ 1). Since [1−λ]/[1+rf] < 1,
the operator T satisﬁes Blackwell’s suﬃciency conditions for a contraction mapping.
Next, we will show if q(y,b0) is an increasing function of b0, then T(q)(y,b0) is also an
increasing function of b0. Fix y, y0 and m0. Let b00 < b01. Proposition 2 implies that
(1 − d∗(y0,m0,b00) ≤ (1 − d∗(y0,m0,b01). Since a∗(y,m,b0) is increasing in b0 by hypoth-
esis and q(y,b0) is increasing in b0 by assumption, it follows that q(y0,a∗(y0,m0,b00)) ≤
q(y0,a∗(y0,m0,b01)). Since y0 and m0 were arbitrary, it follows that T(q)(y,b00) ≤ T(q)(y,b01).
Finally, to establish the result, let ¯ q be any number such that q∗(y,b0) ≤ ¯ q and let Q be the set
of all nonnegative functions q(y,b0) that are increasing in b0 and bounded above by ¯ q. Deﬁne
the norm of any function q ∈ Q as ||q|| = supq(y,b0). Then (Q,|| · ||) is a complete metric
12space. By the previous step, T(q) ∈ Q for any q ∈ Q. Since T is a contraction mapping, it
follows from the Banach contraction mapping principle that there exits a unique ˆ q(y,b0) ∈ Q
such that T(ˆ q) = ˆ q. But then q∗(y,b0) must coincide with ˆ q(y,b0). Hence, q∗(y,b0) must be
increasing in b0. 
Proposition 3 assumed that the bond decision rule conditional on repayment was increasing
in b and showed that the pricing function is increasing in b0. The next proposition shows
that if the pricing function is increasing in b0, then the bond decision rule is increasing in b.
Thus Proposition 3 and 4 are “dual” of each other.
In what follows we will use Xy(b0) to denote maxE(y0 m0)|y max{V (y0,m0,b00),W(y0, ¯ m)}
Proposition 4 : If q(y,b0) is increasing in b0, then in the region where repayment is feasible
a(y,m,b) is increasing in b.
Proof : Fix m and y and suppose that b1 < b0.
Denote a(y,m,b0) by b00 and the associated consumption level by c0. Let ˆ b0 be some other
feasible choice greater than b00 and let ˆ c be the associated consumption level. Then, by
optimality, we have
u(c
0 − m) + βXy(b
00) ≥ u(ˆ c − m) + βXy(ˆ b
0) (6)
Since ˆ b0 > b00, the fact that V (y,m,b) is strictly increasing in b (Proposition 1) implies
Xy(ˆ b0) > Xy(b00). Hence (6) implies c0 > ˆ c. Let ∆ = c0 − ˆ c > 0 denote the loss in current
consumption from choosing ˆ b0 over b00 when the beginning-of-period borrowing is b0. Then
from the budget constraint we have −q(y,b00)[b00 −[1−λ]b0]−∆ = −q(y,ˆ b0)[ˆ b0 −[1−λ]b0],.
Or,−q(y,b00)b00 − ∆ = −q(y,ˆ b0)ˆ b0 + [q(y,ˆ b0) − q(y,b00)][1 − λ]b0. Observe that since ˆ b0 > b00
and, by hypothesis, q(y,b0) is increasing in b0, the term [q(y,ˆ b0) − q(y,b00)] ≥ 0.
Holding ﬁxed ˆ b0 and b00, let ∆(b1) be the value of ∆ that solves −q(y,b00)b00 − ∆(b1) =
−q(y,ˆ b0)ˆ b0+[q(y,ˆ b0)−q(y,b00)][1−λ]b1. Then ∆(b1) is the change in current consumption from
choosing ˆ b0 over b00 when the beginning-of-period asset level is b1. Since [q(y,ˆ b0)−q(y,b00)] ≥
130, b1 < b0 implies ∆(b1) ≥ ∆. Thus the loss in current consumption from choosing ˆ b0 over b00
is at least as large when the beginning-of-period asset holding is b1 as compared to b0. Next,
note that since y−m+[λ+[1−λ]z]b1 < y−m+[λ+[1−λ]z]b0, consumption under the choice
of b00 when the beginning-of-period of bond holdings is b1, denoted c1, is strictly less than c0.
It follows from strict concavity of u(·) that u(c1−m)−u(c1−∆(b1)−m) > u(c0−m)−u(c0−
∆−m). Therefore,u(c1−m)−u(c1−∆(b1)−m) > βXy(ˆ b0)−βXy(b00). Since ˆ b0 is any asset
choice greater than b00, the optimal choice of b0 (under repayment) when beginning-of-period
bond holding is b1 cannot be greater than b00. Therefore, a(y,m,b1) ≤ a(y,m,b0). 
Proposition 5 : In the region where repayment is feasible, a(y,m,b) is decreasing in m.
Proof : Fix y and b and let m0 < m1. Denote a(y,m0,b) by b00 and the associated
consumption by c0. Let ˆ b0 > b00 be some other feasible choice of b0 greater than ˆ b00 and
denote the associated consumption by ˆ c. Then, by optimality, u(c0 − m0)) + βXy(b00) ≥
u(ˆ c − m0)) + βXy(ˆ b0). Since V (y,m,b) is strictly increasing in b (Proposition 1), the above
inequality implies c0 > ˆ c (the implied inequality is strict as long as probability of repayment
of b00 is strictly positive). Since u(c − m1) = u(c − m0) −
R m1
m0 u0(c − x)dx, we have that
u(c0−m1)−u(ˆ c−m1) = u(c0−m0)−u(ˆ c−m0)−
R m1
m0 [u00 − x) − u0(ˆ c − x)dx]. Since c0 > ˆ c,
it follows from the strict monotonicity and concavity of u(·) (diminishing marginal utility)
that u(c0 − m1) − u(ˆ c − m1) > u(c0 − m0) − u(ˆ c − m0). Therefore, b00 strictly dominates ˆ b0
when the minimum consumption requirement is m1. Since ˆ b0 was any asset choice greater
than b00, it follows that a(y,m1,b) cannot exceed b00. Hence a(y,m1,b) ≤ a(y,m0,b). 
Proposition 5 suggests that there is a unique threshold value of m at which the sovereign
will be indiﬀerent between its current choice of borrowing and its next best choice, and, as
m crosses this unique threshold, it will switch from one borrowing level to another. The
following lemma makes this suggestion explicit. It establishes that the sovereign can be
indiﬀerent between any two borrowing levels at exactly one particular value of m. The
Lemma is useful in developing an algorithm for the computation of the equilibrium as well
as in proving the existence of an equilibrium.
14Lemma 1 : Let b00 and b01 be two diﬀerent borrowing levels. There can be at most one
value of m for which the two borrowing levels give the same lifetime utility.
Proof : Since b00 6= b01, it follows from the strict monotonicity of V (y,m,b) that Xy(b00) 6=
Xy(b01). Now suppose that there is an m for which u(c0 − m) + βXy(b00) = u(c1 − m) +
βXy(b01), where c0 and c1 are the level of consumption when b00 and b01 are chosen, re-
spectively. Clearly, c0 6= c1. Suppose, to get a contradiction, that there is another ˜ m such
that u(c0 − ˜ m) + βXy(b00) = u(c1 − ˜ m) + βXy(b01). Let ˜ m − m = ∆. Then, we must have
u(c0 − m) − u(c0 − ∆ − m) = u(c1 − m) − u(c1 − ∆ − m). But, since c0 6= c1, the above
equality violates strict concavity of u(·). Hence there can only be at most one m for which
u(c0 − m) + βXy(b00) = u(c1 − m) + βXy(b01). 
The next proposition relates the set of m values for which there is default. Let D(y,b) =
{m ∈ M : d(y,m,b) = 1}. Then we have:
Proposition 6 : D(y,b) is either the empty set, the whole interval M or a semi-open interval
(m∗, ¯ m] where m∗ ∈ [0, ¯ m).
Proof : Three cases are possible. (i) V (y,0,b) < W(y, ¯ m). Since V is strictly decreasing
in m (Proposition 1), it follows that V (y,m,b) < W(y, ¯ m) for all m ∈ M. Therefore, there
will be default for every realization of m. In this case the default interval is the whole
interval [0, ¯ m] = M (ii) V (y,m,b) < W(y, ¯ m) ≤ V (y,0,b). Then, by the continuity and
strict monotonicity of V with respect to m, there exists a unique m∗ ∈ [0, ¯ m) such that
V (y,m∗,b) = W(y, ¯ m). Then the default interval is (m∗, ¯ m] (iii) W(y, ¯ m) ≤ V (y, ¯ m,b). In
this case, V (y,m,b) is at least as large as W(y, ¯ m) for every realization of m and there will
never be any default. Then, the default set is the empty set. 
The ﬁnal proposition concerns the existence of an equilibrium with the property that the
equilibrium price function q(y,b0) is increasing in b0. The proof relies on the following Lemma
whose proof is given in the Appendix
Lemma 2 : Let qn(y,b0) be a sequence of pricing functions converging to ˆ q(y,b0). Let
d(y,m,b;qn), a(y,m,b;qn) and d(y,m,b; ˆ q), a(y,m,b; ˆ q) be the corresponding optimal deci-
15sion rules. If u(0) is suﬃciently small, d(y,m,b;qn) converges pointwise to d(y,m,b; ˆ q) and
a(y,m,b;q) converges pointwise to a(y,m,b; ˆ q) except, possibly, at a ﬁnite number of points.
Proposition 7 : There exists an equilibrium price function q∗(y,b0) that is increasing in b0.
Proof : Let ¯ q = [λ + [1 − λ]z]/[λ + rf]. Then ¯ q is the present discounted value of a bond
with coupon payment z and probability of maturity λ on which there is no risk of default.
Let S be the set of all non-negative functions q(y,b0) deﬁned on Y × B and let Q ⊂ S be
the subset of functions that are increasing in b0 and bounded above by ¯ q.











Then H has the following properties:
(i) H(q)(y,b0) ∈ Q. Non-negativity is obvious. We will show that H(q)(y,b0) ≤ ¯ q. Observe
that ¯ q satisﬁes the equation ¯ q = [λ+(1−λ)[z + ¯ q]]/(1+rf). Then, since 1−d(y0,m0,b0) ≤ 1






λ + [1 − λ][z + q(y0,a(y0,m0,b0;q))]
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Hence H(q)(y,b0) ≤ ¯ q. Next, we will show that H(q)(y,b0) is increasing in b0. Fix y0 and
m0. Since q(y,b0) ∈ Q, q(y,b0) is increasing in b0. Then, by Proposition 4, a(y0,m0,b0;q) is
increasing in b0. Thus, q(y0,a(y0,m0,b0;q)) is increasing in b0. And, by Proposition 2, [1 −
d(y0,m0,b0;q)] is also increasing in b0. Hence H(q)(y,b0) is increasing in b0. Thus H(q)(y,b0) ∈
Q.
(iii) H(q)(y,b0) is continuous. Let {qn} be a sequence in Q converging to ˆ q ∈ Q and let



























Fix y0 and b0. By Lemma 2, limn[1 − d(y0,m0,b0;qn)] = [1 − d(y0,m0,b0; ˆ q)] for all but a
ﬁnite number of points (possibly) of m0. Since individual points of m have probability zero,
[1−d(y0,m0,b0;qn)] converge almost surely to [1−d(y0,m0,b0; ˆ q)] with respect to the measure
induced by G(m).
Also, by Lemma 2, limn a(y0,m0,b0;qn) = a(y0,m0,b0; ˆ q) for all but a ﬁnite number of points
(possibly) of m0. If convergence holds then, since a(·;qn) takes values in a ﬁnite set B,
there must exist N such that for all n > N a(y0,m0,b0;qn)) = a(y0,m0,b0; ˆ q). There-
fore, for n > N, qn(y0,a(y0,m0,b0;qn)) = qn(y0,a(y0,m0,b0; ˆ q)). Since qn → ˆ q, it follows
that limn qn(y0,a(y0,m0,b0; ˆ q)) = ˆ q(y0,a(y0,m0,b0; ˆ q)). Thus, viewed as a function of m0,
qn(y0,a(y0,m0,b0;qn)) converges almost surely to ˆ q(y0,a(y0,m0,b0; ˆ q)). Therefore, we have
that
lim



















except, possibly, at a ﬁnite number of points.
Now observe that each function in the sequence is non-negative and bounded above by











































Thus H(q) is continuous.
To complete the proof note that Q is a compact and convex set and, since H(q) is continuous,
by Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem there exists q∗ ∈ Q such that q∗(y,b0) = H(q∗)(y,b0).
This establishes the existence of an equilibrium price function that is increasing in b0. 
5 Computation
Computing the equilibrium price function for bonds with maturity greater than one period
is challenging. In this section we discuss the nature of the challenge and how this challenge
is met in our paper.
To understand the new computational issues introduced by long-maturity bonds, it is useful
to begin with the case of one-period bonds (z = 0 and λ = 1) and no m shocks. In this case,













Here qk denotes the k-th iterate of the price function and d(·,·,qk) is the optimal default
function given the price function qk. Since there are no preference shocks, the state variables
in this decision rule are simply endowments and beginning-of-period bond-holdings. For the
iteration to converge, it is important that small changes between the k-th and the k + 1-st
iterate of the price function not imply a large change between the k +1-st and the k +2-nd
18iterate. However, because default is a discrete choice, a small change in the price function
can lead to a switch in behavior from default to repayment (or vice versa). This will happen
if for some qk the sovereign is very close to indiﬀerence between the choice of default and
repayment for some (y,b) pair. If a switch happens for a small change in the pricing function,
the expectation in (7) may change discretely. The reason for this is that the number of grid
points on y is typically not large in applications and so each point on the y grid has signiﬁcant
probability mass. Thus, a discrete change in behavior for some y can change the expectation
discretely. However, note that for any given y the indiﬀerence between default and repayment
will happen for a very speciﬁc value of b. If this b value is not part of the grid, this problem
may not arise. Indeed, in the simulations done with the parameters used in this paper there
is never a convergence problem with one-period bonds.4
The diﬃculty is compounded when bonds can last more than one period. In this case,













Now, the calculation of the k+1-st iterate depends on the a(·,·;qk) decision rule as well. This
creates two problems. First, it is no longer possible to have a coarse grid on bond holdings.
A coarse grid would imply that whenever a small change in the pricing function induces the
sovereign to switch its desired level of bond-holdings, the switch would aﬀect the expectation
in (8) discretely. But making the grid ﬁner does not overcome this problem. The budget
set under repayment is typically not convex (because q(y,b0) is a nonlinear function of b0)
or future expected utility Xy(b0), as a function of b0), has nonconcave segments (see Figures
1 and 2). These nonconvexities imply that, given (y,b), the sovereign may be indiﬀerent
between two widely separated values of b0. Thus there may be jumps in the decision rule
a(y,b;qk) viewed as a function of qk. These jumps in decisions then cause large changes in
4Nevertheless, it remains true that the problem associated with indiﬀerence and switching is more likely
to arise for a ﬁne set of grid points on b because a ﬁne set is more likely to contain a grid point at which
there is near-indiﬀerence. In this sense, there is a trade-oﬀ between an accurate solution to the sovereign’s
decision problem and the ease with which the equilibrium pricing function can be computed.
19the future value of the outstanding bonds and therefore in the current price.

























































To summarize, the jumps (or discontinuities) in the decision rules stem from the possibility of
default and the resulting non-convexity of the budget set under repayment and non-concavity
of the value function. Thus the jumps are an intrinsic part of the decision problem being
studied here and cannot be avoided. Given this, the only approach to solving the problem is
to arrange matters so that the jumps do not aﬀect the expected value in (8) too much. For
that purpose we introduce the continuous i.i.d variable m, and the solution of the model is
found by calculating the thresholds over m where a switch occurs between diﬀerent choices
of non-dominated asset holdings (the algorithm will be described in more detail below). This
implies that when there is a small change in price, the change in the threshold will also be
small, even though at the threshold there might be a big jump in asset holdings. Since
the probability mass over which there is a change in behavior approximates to zero with a
continuous distribution (when the change in threshold is small), the change in the expected
value in (8) is negligible.
20Note that it is not possible to apply the above method over y because the asset choice is
not monotonic in y, and we cannot calculate thresholds for y in order to solve the model. In
contrast, as shown in Propositions 5 the choice of assets is monotonic in m and it is possible
to calculate thresholds over which a switch might occur from a choice of lower asset level
to a higher asset level. This diﬀerence is due to the fact that the m shock is i.i.d while the
y shock is not. Of course, it is possible to simply increase the number of grid points over
y in order to reduce the impact of jumps. Increasing the grid points on y does help with
convergence. Nevertheless, convergence to an error of 0.01 or less in the pricing of q was not
achieved even with the ﬁnest grids used that were computationally possible. And increasing
the ﬁneness of the grid on y slows down the program disproportionately. For these reasons
we added the variable m and we chose its volatility to be as low as possible so that there is
convergence of the pricing function and at the same time the impact of adding m on model
properties is negligible. We veriﬁed that the impact of m on quantitative results is negligible
for the one-period bond case, since in that case the model without the m shock can be solved
(these results are discussed later in the paper).
We now describe our solution algorithm. To solve the model, we use the characterization of
behavior with respect to m, namely, Propositions 5 and 6. Proposition 6 indicates that we
need to locate one value of m at which the sovereign is indiﬀerent between repayment and
default, if such a point exists. Proposition 5 indicates that the choice of b0 is decreasing in
m; as m increases, the optimal decision switches to a lower value of b0.
However, Proposition 5 does not imply that as m increases, the next optimal choice of b0
will be adjacent to the current optimal choice. As noted earlier, the nonlinearity of the
pricing function or nonconcavity of the value function may imply that the sovereign ﬁnds it
optimal to switch between widely separated values of b0. This fact raises a challenge in the
computation. Evidently, Proposition 5 implies that there exists {m1 < m2 < ... < mK−1 <
¯ m} and {b01 > b02 > ... > b0K} such that b01 is chosen for all m ∈ [0,m1), b02 is chosen
for all m ∈ [m1,m2), ..., b0K is chosen for all m ∈ (mK−1, ¯ m]. But since b0k−1 need not be
adjacent to b0k, how does one ﬁnd the values of b0k and the associated values of mk?
21To understand the algorithm we use to determine the {(mk,b0k)} pairs, imagine that we
have located the pairs {(m1,b01),(m2,b02),...(mg,b0g)}. To proceed, compare the utility
from choosing b0g with the utility from choosing the next lower asset level b0− (higher debt
level; b0− < b0g) for diﬀerent values of m. Two cases are possible.
1. b0g is better than b0− for all m ∈ M. That might happen if the asset choice b0− does
not increase consumption today. Then, we drop b0− from further consideration and
move to comparing b0g to the next lower asset level.
2. There is a value of m denoted ˜ m, for which the two choices give the same utility. By
Lemma 1 there can be exactly one such m. Here two cases are possible:
(a) If ˜ m ≥ mg, then we add (˜ m,b0−) to the list of pairs and proceed to compare the
utility between b0− with the next lower asset level.
(b) If ˜ m < mg , we drop b0g from further consideration and proceed backwards to
compare b0− with b0g−1. The reason is that ˜ m < mg implies that b0− is preferred
to b0g for any m > ˜ m and at the same time b0g−1 is preferred to b0g for any m < mg.
This implies that b0g is dominated by the choices of b0g−1 and b0− and will never
be chosen. Thus it can be dropped from further consideration. When this is the
case, b0− needs to be compared to b0g−1. The process is continued by ﬁnding a
new e m2 between the choices of b0− and b0g−1. If ˜ m2 ≥ mg−1, then we add (˜ m2,b0−)
to the list of pairs and proceed to compare the utility between b0− with the next
lower level of assets. If ˜ m2 < mg−1, we drop b0g−1 from further consideration and
continue to go backwards through the list. This process will either end in ﬁnding
mg−j that is less than or equal to ˜ mj+1 or in the exhaustion of all pairs in the list
{mk,b0k}. If the latter, we conclude that b0− dominates any b0 > b0− for all m
and proceed to compare b0− with the next lower level of debt.
To implement this algorithm we start oﬀ with the list {(¯ m,0)} (meaning that no borrowing is
optimal for all m) and then proceed to compare 0 with the next level of debt. The algorithm
22is applied until every element of B has been picked up and compared to the existing list.
6 Maturity, Indebtedness, and Spreads: The Argen-
tine Case
We apply the framework developed in the previous sections to the Argentine case. Our
objective is to simultaneously account for the average default spreads on Argentine bonds
as well as the average indebtedness of Argentina over the 10-year period between 1991:Q1
and 2001:Q4. This is also the time period analyzed in Arellano (2008).5 Arellano focused
on understanding the average default spreads on Argentine bonds but did not attempt to
match Argentina’s average debt level. The main contribution of our quantitative work is to
establish that allowing for long-duration bonds, besides being a closer ﬁt with reality, helps
to match both the level of spreads and the level of average indebtedness.
For the quantitative work we make the following speciﬁc functional form or distributional
assumptions.
• Endowment process: The stochastic evolution of yt is governed by an AR-1 process in
logs:







• Preference shock process: The preference shock m is drawn from a truncated normal
distribution with support [0, ¯ m] centered at ¯ m/2 and with variance σ2
m .
5Arellano (2008) restricted her sample period to 1993-2001 on grounds of data availability. We use the
data presented in Neumeyer and Perri (2005), which are easily available and widely used and cover all
quarters between 1980 and 2002. We chose to examine the period between 1991-2001 because prior to 1991
Argentina was experiencing hyperinﬂation. Inﬂation fell when Argentina adopted a currency board in March
1991 that ﬁxed the value of the peso in terms of the dollar at parity (1 to 1). Argentina remained on parity
all the way through to its default in December 2001. Parity was abandoned in January 2002. Thus, the
period 1991-2001 had a stable ﬁxed foreign exchange regime in place. Since neither we nor Arellano model
the determination of the exchange rate, the period 1991-2001 is a natural period for us to focus on.
23• Utility function: Assumed to be (c − m)
1−γ /(1 − γ).
• Following Arellano (2008), the output loss in the event of default or exclusion is as-





0 if y ≤ y
y − y if y > y
.
With these assumptions, the numerical speciﬁcation of the model requires giving values to 11
parameters. These are (i) two endowment process parameters ρ and σ2
, (ii) four preference
parameters β, γ, ¯ m and σ2
m, (iii) two parameters describing the bond, the maturity parameter
λ and the coupon payment z, (iv) the default output loss parameter ¯ y, (v) the probability
of re-entry following default, ξ, and (vi) the risk-free rate rf.
The parameter selection proceeds as follows. The endowment process was determined by
ﬁtting the AR-1 process to the quarterly real GDP data over the period 1980:1-2001:4.6 The
estimation yields a value of ρ = 0.93 and σ = 0.0272. Of the preference parameters, the
value of the γ is set equal to 2, which is the standard value used in this literature. The
precise value of ¯ m is not important to the results and so it was set at a relatively small
number, 0.054, which implies that the mean m is 0.027. The value of σ2
m was set at 0.009,
which is one-third of the variance of the innovation to income. For this value the search
routine employed to match moments converged easily.
The parameters describing the bond were determined to match the maturity and coupon
information for Argentina reported in Broner, Lorenzoni and Schumkler (2007). The average
coupon rate is about 12 percent per annum, or 0.03 per quarter, and the median maturity
of Argentine bonds is 5 years or 20 quarters. Thus, z = 0.03 and λ = 1/20 = 0.05. Re-
entry into the ﬁnancial market following default usually occurs between 2 to 3 years and so
ξ = 0.10, which gives an average period of exclusion of 10 quarters or 2.5 years. The risk-free
6The quarterly data series on real GDP, real aggregate consumer expenditure, real exports, real imports
and the (nominal) interest rate on Argentine sovereign debt is taken from Neumeyer and Perri (2005). All
the quantity variables were deseasonalized using the multiplicative X-12 routine in Eviews.
24rate, rf, was set at 0.01, which is roughly the real rate of return on a 3-month (one quarter)
U.S. Treasury bill.
The two remaining parameters β and ¯ y are picked to match as closely as possible 70 percent
of the average debt-to-output ratio and the average default spreads over the period 1990-
2001.7 We seek to match only a portion of the Argentine debt because we do not model
repayment. In reality, most sovereign debt that goes into default pays oﬀ something. In
Argentina’s case, the repayment on debt defaulted on in 2001 has been around 30 cents to
the dollar. Thus, we treat only 70 cents out of each dollar of debt as the truly unsecured
portion of the debt.
We need to determine what in the model corresponds to the observed debt-to-output ratio
and the observed default spreads. In the data, the value of a bond is a weighted average of
its market value at time of issue and the face value of the bond, where the weight on the
latter is higher the closer the bond is to maturity. The value of total debt is just the sum
of the value of individual bonds calculated in this way. Since the bonds in our model do
not have a maturity date, we cannot replicate this procedure exactly. What we do instead
is value the promised stream of payments on a bond at the risk-free rate so that we can
capture the averaging between the market value at the date of issue and the face value.
The default spread in the model is calculated as follows. Given the unit price q(y,b) of the
outstanding bonds, we calculate an internal rate of return that makes the present discounted
value of the promised sequence of future payments on a unit bond equal to the unit price.
If the interest rate is r, the present discounted value of the promised sequence of payments
on the bond is [λ+(1−λ)z]/[λ+r]. The required internal rate of return is given by r(y,b0)
such that q(y,b0) = [λ + (1 − λ)z]/[λ + r(y,b0)]. The diﬀerence between (1 + r(y,b0))4 − 1
7Debt is total public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt outstanding and disbursed and owed to both
private and oﬃcial creditors at the end of each year, as reported in the World Bank’s Global Development
Finance Database. The average debt-to-output ratio is the average ratio of debt to GNP measured at
a quarterly rate. The spread was calculated as the diﬀerence between the interest rate data reported in
Neumeyer and Perri (which is the same as the EMBI data) and the 3-month T-bill rate. The T-bill rate
series used is the TB3MS series available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/116.
Both the interest rate data and the T-bill rate are reported in annualized terms.
25and (1 + rf)4 − 1 is the annualized default spread in the model.
The parameter selections are summarized in the following two tables. Table 1 lists the values
of the parameters that are selected directly without solving for the equilibrium of the model.
Table 2 lists the parameter values that are selected by solving the equilibrium of the model
and choosing the parameters so as to make the model moments come as close as possible to
the data moments.
Table 1: Parameters Selected Directly
Parameter Description Value
γ risk aversion 2
¯ m upper bound on m 0.054
σm standard deviation of m 0.009
σ standard deviation of  0.0272
ρ autocorrelation 0.93
ξ probability of reentry 0.10
rf risk free return 0.01
λ reciprocal of ave. maturity 0.05
z coupon payments 0.03
Table 2: Parameters Selected by Matching Moments
Parameter Description Value
β discount factor 0.968
¯ y default punishment 0.879
The results are reported in Table 3. The top row reports the data for Argentina. The aver-
age risk spread over the period 1991-2001 is 8.8 percent. The average debt-to-output ratio
is 1.00. The debt service ratio, which is the ratio of the average annual payment on debt
(interest and principal) to output, is 5.5 percent.
26Table 3: Results and Comparison
Def. Freq. Spread Debt-to-Y Debt Service
Data 0.0568 0.0876 1.00 0.055
Baseline λ = 0.05,z = 0.03 0.0594 0.0877 0.70 0.041
Arellano (λ = 1) 0.0300 0.0358 0.06 0.053
Baseline with λ = 1 0.0033 0.0036 0.48 0.480
The second row reports the same moments in the model. Recall that we search over the
values of β and ¯ y to match the average spread and 70 percent of the average debt-to-output
ratio. It is evident that the matching exercise is fully successful. We do not target the debt
service ratio but the agreement between model and data is close for this statistic, given that
we are matching only a 70 percent of the total debt outstanding.
The third row of the table reports, for comparison, the statistics as given in Arellano (2008,
Table 4, p. 706) for the variable in question. Notice that both the average spreads as well
as the average debt-to-output ratio depart signiﬁcantly from the data, the latter greatly
so. Arellano did not attempt to match these statistics, but it nevertheless remains true that
there is a major discrepancy between the quantitative predictions of her model and the data.
Table 3 also reports the frequency of default in the model. This is a quantity that Arellano
targets but we do not. The evidence on the frequency of default comes from Reinhart, Rogoﬀ
and Savastano (2003, Table 1). On average, emerging markets defaulted 5.2 times in 126
years, which implies an annual default frequency of about 4 percent. Including the most
recent default, the comparable statistic for Argentina is little under 4 percent. Thus this
evidence seems closer to Arellano’s 3 percent than our 6 percent. However, our statistic is
calculated conditional on the country being in good standing (i.e., not in autarky due to
default) and in debt. Reinhart et al. note that, on average, emerging markets spent 27.3
percent of 126 years in default or in restructuring. Presumably, these countries did not have
access to new credit during these times. Excluding these years from the calculation of default
frequency, the average annual default frequency is 0.0568. The corresponding frequency for
Argentina, including the most recent default, is 0.0525. These statistics are very close to
27the default frequency generated by our model. Thus, the correspondence between model
predictions and data is excellent along this dimension as well.
Table 3 also indicates that in our model the default frequency is less than the default spread.
At ﬁrst sight this seems surprising since we expect the default frequency to be close to the
default spread. But recall that [1 + r(y,b0)] · q(y,b0) = λ + (1 − λ)[z + q(y,b0)] and that [1 +
rf]·q(y,b0) = E(y0 m0)|y[1−d(y0,m0,b0;q)][λ + (1 − λ)[z + q(y0,a(y0,m0,b0))]]. This expectation







where m(y0,b0) is the threshold value of m below which there is repayment conditional on y0










λ + (1 − λ)[z + q(y,b0)]
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0,y) = 1 − π(y,b
0)
where we have denoted the probability of default next period on a loan of size b0 conditional
on the current period’s output being y by π(y,b0). Taking logs on both sides and treating
all interest rates and probabilities as small numbers we get r(y,b0) − rf ≈ π(y,b0). Thus,
default spread is closely tied to default frequency.
When bonds mature in more than one period (i.e., λ < 1), there is no simple connection
between default spreads and default frequency because the sovereign’s behavior under repay-
ment matters also. To see how default spreads can exceed the default probability, suppose
that the sovereign increases borrowing in the current period, i.e., b0 < b. Given that y is
persistent, i.e., F(y0 = y,y) ≈ 1 and m is iid with most of the mass in and around the mean





[λ + (1 − λ)[z + q(y,a(y, ¯ m/2,b0))]]
λ + (1 − λ)[z + q(y,b0)]
.
28If we further assume that current m is also ¯ m/2, then we know from Proposition 4 that
a(y, ¯ m/2,b0) ≤ a(y, ¯ m/2,b) = b0. And, so, by Proposition 3, q(y,a(y, ¯ m/2,b0)) ≤ q(y,b0).
Thus, the ratio multiplying G(m(y,b0) will tend to be less than 1. If we denote this ratio
by (1 − θ), where θ is some positive number between 0 and 1, then (1 + rf)/(1 + r) ≈
[1 − π(y,b0)](1 − θ). Or taking logs and treating all numbers as small, r − rf ≈ π(y,b0) + θ.
Basically, if the debt level is expected to increase tomorrow, there will be a capital loss on
the value of bonds, which creates a wedge between default probability and spreads, shown
by θ > 0 above. If debt is expected to decrease in the future, the same logic applies in
the other direction, with θ < 0. Because the sovereign starts with zero debt and increases
its debt gradually over time (because it is impatient relative to the rest of the world), on
average θ > 0 and we see a positive wedge between spreads and default probability.
The role of maturity in creating a wedge between default spreads and default frequency is a
useful insight. In the past, researchers working with one-period debt models have sought to
explain the existence of this gap in the data (a gap that does not arise in one-period debt
models) in terms of risk aversion of the lenders. For instance, noting the large gap between
the default frequency predicted by her model and average spreads, Arellano suggested that
the diﬀerence comes about because the aggregate states in which a sovereign defaults are
also the states in which the lender’s marginal utility of wealth is high. This may happen
because lenders have ﬁnite wealth or because there is correlated defaults or both. While
there is probably truth to these assertions, our model shows that it is not logically necessary
to invoke risk aversion to account for a gap between default spreads and default frequency.
A gap can arise as a consequence of the long-term nature of sovereign debt and the dynamics
of debt accumulation and de-accumulation.
Although we made no attempt to target cyclical properties of the data, we report these
properties in Table 4. Following Arellano, we report correlations and standard deviations
for deviations from a linear trend for the data.8
8In calculating these statistics for our model, we exclude the ﬁrst 20 periods following re-entry into the
international capital markets. In the period following re-entry, the debt and spread statistics are atypical
in the model because the country has no debt and begins to accumulate debt pretty much regardless of the
29Table 4: Cyclical Properties, Data and Models
Variable Data (1980:Q1-2001:Q4) Model Arellano∗∗
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.09 1.10 1.10
σ(NX)/σ(y) 0.31 0.22 0.26
σ(r − rf)∗/σ(y) 0.58 1.43 1.09
σ(c,y) 0.98 0.97 0.97
σ(NX,y) −0.86 −0.33 −0.25
σ(r − rf,y)∗ −0.77 −0.68 −0.29
*Data for 1991:Q1-2001:Q4 only is used.
*Data adapted from Arellano (2008), Table 4.
The ﬁrst column reports the data. Three features of the data stand out. First, the relative
volatility of consumption is about the same as output – in stark contrast to developed
countries. Second, the trade balance is countercyclical – net exports decline during periods
of above-trend output and rise during periods of below-trend output. This is also in contrast
to developed countries. And, third, spreads on sovereign debt are countercyclical.
The second column reports the same statistics for the model. The model gets most of the
qualitative patterns of the data right: model consumption and trade balance have about the
right level of volatility relative to output and the trade balance and spreads are counter-
cyclical while consumption is highly procyclical. The volatility of spreads is much greater
in the model than in the data but this discrepancy may be more apparent than real and
is discussed more below. The forces in the model that lead to these patterns are the ones
emphasized in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). When output is below
trend, the probability of default on new loans rises. If this rise is sharp enough, it is optimal
for the sovereign to reduce debt rather than to increase it (so as to smooth consumption).
Thus, there is a tendency for consumption to decline more than the decline in output and
for the trade balance to improve with a fall in output.
level of output. This debt accumulation phase attenuates the negative correlation between net exports and
output. In reality, Argentina emerged from re-structuring episodes in the 1980s and 1990s with debt so it
did not have the same incentive for debt accumulation as exists in our model.
30The third column reports the results for the benchmark model in Arellano (2008). Evidently
our model has about the same level of success as Arellano’s in accounting for the cyclical
facts. The main diﬀerences appear to be with regard to the behavior of spreads. Compared
to that in Arellano’s model, the volatility of spreads in our model is further away from the
data, while the correlation of spreads with output is closer. The reason model volatility is
high is due to very sharp upward spikes in spreads just prior to default. Aside from these
spikes, the behavior of spreads is reasonably close to the data. This can be seen in Figure 3
which plots of the actual and simulated spreads for the period 1991:Q1-2001:Q4. Except for
the period right before default, the model spreads track the data reasonably well although
the model spread is generally below the actual spread in the ﬁgure.






















The close concordance between the data and model moments shown in Table 3 and 4 raises
the question: to what extent is this concordance the result of including long-term debt?
There are two ways of answering this question. One way is to simply ask what happens to
the equilibrium of the model if all debt is restricted to be one period. The results from this
31exercise are shown in the bottom row of Table 3. Observe that both the default premium
(spreads) and the debt-to-income ratio are much lower. The average spread is now around
0.4 percent and the debt-to-output ratio drops to 48 percent. The default frequency is
very close to the default spread (as one would expect in a one-period debt model) and
implies that there will be 1 default episode, on average, every 333 years. The debt service
is very close to the debt-to-output ratio because all debt is due in one-period. Finally, the
volatility of consumption rises as the sovereign engages less in consumption smoothing – the
standard deviation of consumption is around 115 percent of the standard deviation of output.
Evidently, both spreads and the debt-to-output ratio are very sensitive to the maturity of
the bond. Lengthening the maturity (and keeping all else constant) raises the equilibrium
value of these variables.
A second way to answer this question is to ask what is the best that a model with one-period
debt can do in terms of matching the debt and spread statistics? We answer this question
by ﬁxing the values of all parameters mentioned in Table 1 at their Table 1 values, except
for the values λ and z, which are now set to 1 (only short-term debt) and 0 (no coupon
payments), respectively. As before, the value of β and ¯ y are chosen to match the average
spreads and 70 percent of the average debt-to-output ratio. Tables 5-7 report the results.
Table 5
Parameter Description Value
β discount factor 0.690
¯ y default punishment 0.844
Table 6
Def. Freq. Spread Debt-to-Output Debt Service
Data 0.0876 1.00 0.055
λ = 1,z = 0 0.0776 0.0874 0.70 0.693
λ = 0.05,z = 0.03 0.0594 0.0877 0.70 0.041
It is possible to match the debt-to-output ratio and the average spreads pretty closely even
in a model with one-period debt. But the default frequency is close to the average spread
32and the debt service is close to the debt-to-output ratio. Both of these statistics are too high
relative to the data, but they are entirely expected given the one-period nature of bonds.
Observe that the discount factor needed to match the spread and debt-to-output ratio is
very low relative to the long-term debt model. The value of ¯ y is comparable.
Table 7: Cyclical Properties, One-Period Debt Model
Variable Data One-Period Debt Long-term Debt
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.09 1.83 1.10
σ(NX)/σ(y) 0.31 1.29 0.22
σ(r − rf)∗/σ(y) 0.58 0.81 1.43
σ(c,y) 0.98 0.69 0.97
σ(NX,y) −0.86 −0.21 −0.33
σ(r − rf,y)∗ −0.77 −0.58 −0.68
*Data for 1991:Q1-2001:Q4 only is used.
The way in which this matching exercise fails is with regard to the implied cyclical prop-
erties. The relative volatility of consumption and trade balance is huge compared to the
data. Essentially, the model matches the debt and spread statistics by making the sovereign
very impatient. Greater impatience generates more borrowing and higher spreads. But the
volatility in spreads, because all debt must be “rolled over” each period, implies a much
higher level of volatility in net exports and, therefore, consumption.9
Are these one-period debt results sensitive to the way the default punishment is modeled
and to the existence of m shocks themselves? We considered the case where default leaves
the value of m unchanged (as opposed to raising it to ¯ m).10 It is possible ﬁnd values of β
9If we expanded the set of targets to include the relative volatility of consumption and insisted that
the model output match the relative volatility very closely, the results would begin to resemble those in
Arellano (2008). The model will match the relative volatility closely but the average spread and the average
debt-to-output ratio will drop signiﬁcantly from their target values.
10For this speciﬁcation the set of m values for which the sovereign would choose to default is an interval
of the form (mL, mU). A proof of this statement can be constructed along the lines of the proof given for
Theorem 3 in Chatterjee et al.(2007). Thus, the computation must now locate two thresholds rather than
one.
33and ¯ y that matched the average spreads and 70 percent of the average debt-to-output ratio
(all other parameters were chosen as in Table 1 with the exception of λ and z, which were set
at 1 and 0, respectively). These values turned out to be 0.71 and 0.841, respectively. Since
these are very close to the values found earlier, the cyclical properties of the model is very
similar as well. In particular, the relative volatility of consumption remained high at 1.86.
Since it is not necessary to assume the existence of m shocks to compute the one-period debt
model, we also checked to see how the results change if we shut oﬀ the m shocks completely.
The eﬀects of doing this were minor. The average spread and the average debt-output ratio
rose slightly to 8.81 and 0.71, respectively, and the relative volatility of consumption also
rose slightly to 1.88.









Figure 4: Spreads for Long-term and Short-term Bonds (Above-Trend y)
























Figure 5: Spreads for Long-term and Short-term Bonds (Below-Trend y)












To understand why long-term debt improves model performance we can look at Figures 4
and 5. These ﬁgures show how spreads behave with respect to borrowing in the models
with long-term and short-term debt. Figure 4 shows these relationships when output is
above trend. Observe that spreads are higher and rise more gradually for the long-term
34bond case than the short-term bond case. The spreads are higher because lenders anticipate
that the country will borrow more in the future and thereby inﬂict capital losses on them.
The spreads rise gradually because the incentive to default does not rise rapidly with debt
– the fact that the country needs to “roll over” only a portion of its debt makes repayment
an attractive option. The same gradual increase in spreads is evident in Figure 5 as well
which shows the situation for below-trend output (observe that the scale for spreads is very
diﬀerent).
We can obtain some further intuition on how the model works by considering the sovereign’s
decision to issue additional debt. Although this choice is discrete in the model, we may think
of it as being continuous for the moment. Also, for the moment, ignore the preference shock.
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To understand the expression, it is easier to think of the sovereign as a “monopolistic”
supplier of bonds. When the sovereign issues an extra unit of bond, it gets revenue from
that extra unit sold, but at the same time the decrease in the price of the bond (because of
increased default probability) decreases the revenue on all bonds that are currently issued.
The sovereign borrows more with long-term bond because both the price schedule is ﬂatter
with long-term bonds (as seen in the ﬁgures), and also because the decrease in the price of
the bond due to extra borrowing aﬀects only the currently issued bonds, and with long-term
bonds, the currently issued bonds are just a small portion of the outstanding debt.
The average spreads are much higher with long-term bonds. There are two reasons for
this. One is, as we see in the above equation, the sovereign more readily enters these high
probability of default regions, since it does not internalize the eﬀect that increasing the level
of debt has on decreasing the value of bonds issued in previous periods (which explains why
the lenders take into account that the country will increase its debt in future periods and
charge high spreads from the start). The second reason is that, with long-term bonds, just
35before defaulting, the sovereign issues high levels of debt at very high spreads. Typically,
with long-term bonds, it is not very costly to delay default by one more period (by just
paying the portion λ of the debt). But by borrowing at high spreads the sovereign can
disproportionately tax the high-income outcomes next period (where it will not default),
and consume more today. And it does borrow at very high spreads just before defaulting
with long-term bonds. In contrast, with short-term debt this opportunity never arises, since
raising enough money at very high spreads to reﬁnance all existing debt becomes impossible.
The ﬁnal issue we address is the welfare eﬀects of lengthening maturity. In particular, we
compare the welfare eﬀects of moving from an environment with one-period bonds to one
with long-term bonds. This comparison is done in the following way. We imagine that at
some randomly chosen period, the sovereign is oﬀered the option to issue long-term debt of
the type (λ = 0.05,z = 0.03). This option is oﬀered after the sovereign has chosen to repay
whatever one-period debt is due that period but before it gets to choose its new level of
short-term debt. We calculate the percentage of consumption the sovereign would be willing












for those states in which V 0,1(y,m,b) ≥ W 0,1(y, ¯ m), where V z,λ(y,m,b) is the value function
when debt has coupon z and maturity λ. We simulate our model economy with one-period
debt over many periods and calculate the mean φ over all such no-default states. It turns out
that the mean φ is 0.995, meaning that the option to issue long-term debt is not valuable.
The sovereign would be willing to pay, on average, 0.5 percent of consumption in perpetuity
to not be forced to issue long-term debt of type (0.03,0.05).
Why is this? The welfare-decreasing eﬀect of long-term bonds comes from the fact that the
sovereign cannot commit to limit its future borrowing. The sovereign imposes a negative
externality on international lenders who hold the sovereign’s bonds when it increases its
36debt level (by inﬂicting a capital loss on the lenders bond holdings). With long-term bonds,
the sovereign does not internalize this externality. Nevertheless, it pays the cost in previous
periods because lenders take into account the sovereign’s future actions when they purchase
the sovereign’s bonds. In contrast, when the sovereign issues all its bonds simultaneously each
period, it internalizes the eﬀect of capital loss incurred by additional borrowing. Although
long-maturity debt provides more insurance with respect to adverse output shocks (only
a small portion of the outstanding debt needs to be reﬁnanced at a higher interest rate),
this insurance does not turn out to be very valuable in the simulations. We have already
seen that with one-period debt, the average level of debt and the average default spread
is low (recall the last row of Table 3). In other words, with one-period debt the sovereign
avoids getting into regions to default. Since the sovereign is not saddled with a lot of debt
to begin with, the ﬂexibility of repayment does not have much value, and thus there is no
welfare gain from the option to issue long-term debt. However, this logic leaves open the
possibility that for some other model parameters and some other choice of coupon payment
and maturity, the option to issue long-term bonds may be valuable. Also, note that our
model does not include features that might make long-term bonds more attractive relative
to short-term bonds. In particular, there are no transactions costs of participating in the
international credit market and there are no coordination issues between lenders that might
lead to a “run” on short-term debt; i.e., we do not model the possibility that lenders become
unwilling to roll over short-term debt because other lenders are reluctant to do the same.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a tractable model of long-term sovereign debt and applied it
to understanding the behavior of debt and default spreads in an emerging market, namely,
Argentina. We showed that introducing long-term debt improves upon existing quantitative
models of sovereign debt in matching the average default spreads and the average level of the
debt-to-output ratio, without sacriﬁcing the model’s ability to account for the key cyclical
37patterns in emerging market economies, namely, the relatively high volatility of consumption
and the countercyclicality of spreads (on sovereign debt) and the trade balance. We also
provided a fairly complete set of characterization results regarding the default and borrowing
behavior of the sovereign as well as a proof of the existence of an equilibrium pricing function
with the property that the price of debt is decreasing in the amount of debt issued. We
also addressed issues pertaining to the computation of long-term debt models, providing
a novel and useful algorithm for computing the decision rule for debt in the presence of
non-convexities.
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9 Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 2
The proof proceeds in 4 steps. The ﬁrst step is to establish that if u(0) is low enough, optimal
consumption is always bounded below by a strictly positive number. Given this result, the
second step shows that for two pricing functions suﬃciently close to each other, any action
feasible under one pricing function is also feasible under the other pricing function. Given
this result, the third step shows that value functions are continuous in prices. The lemma
follows easily from this step.
Step 1 (Optimal consumption is bounded below by a positive number). Since u(·) is bounded
above, let M be such that supx≥0 u(x) = M. Let y = minY . Assume that u(0) is low enough
so that u(0)+βM/(1−β) < u(y−φ(y)− ¯ m)/(1−β). Then, by continuity of u there exists
c > 0 such that u(c) + βM/(1 − β) < u(y − φ(y) − ¯ m)/(1 − β). Then optimal consumption
can never fall below c. Since the sovereign can always consume at least y−φ(y) each period
it can guarantee itself a lifetime utility of at least u(y−φ(y)− ¯ m)/(1−β). The highest utility
possible from selecting an action that leads to consumption c or less is u(c)+βM/(1−β). By
assumption the former dominates the latter. Hence it is never optimal to choose to consume
39c or less.
Step 2 (Optimal decision rules under ˆ q are feasible under qn and optimal decision rules
under qn are feasible under ˆ q). Deﬁne c(y,m,b;q) as the optimal consumption under prices
q. That is, c(y,m,b;q) = y − φ(y) if d(y,m,b;q) = 1 and c(y,m,b;q) = y + [λ + (1 −
λ)z]b + q(y,a(y,m,b;q))[a(y,m,b;q) − (1 − λ)b] if d(y,m,b;q) = 0. Deﬁne cn(y,m,b; ˆ q)
as cn(y,m,b; ˆ q) = y − φ(y) if d(y,m,b; ˆ q) = 1 and cn(y,m,b; ˆ q) = y + [λ + (1 − λ)z]b +
ˆ q(y,a(y,m,b;qn))[a(y,m,b;qn) − (1 − λ)b] if d(y,m,b; ˆ q) = 0. And deﬁne ˆ c(y,m,b;qn) as
ˆ c(y,m,b;qn) = y − φ(y) if d(y,m,b;qn) = 1 and ˆ c(y,m,b;qn) = y + [λ + (1 − λ)z]b +
qn(y,a(y,m,b; ˆ q))[a(y,m,b; ˆ q) − (1 − λ)b] if d(y,m,b;qn) = 0.
Consider the diﬀerence cn(y,m,b; ˆ q) − c(y,m,b;qn). The diﬀerence is 0 for y,m,b such that
d(y,m,b;qn) = 1 and it is ˆ q(y,a(y,m,b;qn))a(y,m,b;qn) − qn(y,a(y,m,b;qn))a(y,m,b;qn)
otherwise. Therefore
|c
n(y,m,b; ˆ q) − c(y,m,b;q










Since qn → ˆ q, maxb0 |ˆ q(y,b0) − qn(y,b0)| → 0. Hence cn(y,m,b; ˆ q) converges to c(y,m,b;qn).
This implies that there exists N such that for all n ≥ N, |cn(y,m,b; ˆ q) − c(y,m,b;qn)| < c.
Hence cn(y,m,b; ˆ q) > c(y,m,b;qn) − c. By Step 1 c(y,m,b;qn) − c > 0 and therefore
cn(y,m,b; ˆ q) is feasible for all n ≥ N.
Next, consider the diﬀerence ˆ c(y,m,b;qn) − c(y,m,b; ˆ q). We have
|ˆ c(y,m,b;q
n) − c(y,m,b; ˆ q)| ≤ |q
n(y,a(y,m,b; ˆ q)) − ˆ q(y,a(y,m,b; ˆ q))||a(y,m,b; ˆ q)|.
Since qn → ˆ q, c(y,m,b;qn) converges to c(y,m,b; ˆ q). Therefore, there exists N such that for
all n ≥ N |ˆ c(y,m,b;qn) − c(y,m,b; ˆ q)| < c. Therefore, ˆ c(y,m,b;qn) > c(y,m,b; ˆ q) − c > 0.
Thus ˆ c(y,m,b;qn) is feasible for all n ≥ N.
Step 3 (Continuity of V (y,m,b;q), W(y, ¯ m;q) and Xy(b0;q) with respect to q). Let qn →
40ˆ q. Deﬁne ˆ V (y,m,b;qn) as the utility under repayment from following the decision rules
d(y,m,b; ˆ q) and a(y,m,b; ˆ q) when the price function is qn. And deﬁne V n(y,m,b; ˆ q) as the
utility under repayment from following the decision rules d(y,m,b;qn) and a(y,m,b;qn) when
the price function is ˆ q. By Step 2 these constructs are well-deﬁned. Then V (y,m,b;qn) ≥
ˆ V (y,m,b;qn) and V (y,m,b; ˆ q) ≥ V n(y,m,b; ˆ q). Observe that the ﬁrst inequality implies
V (y,m,b;qn) ≥ ˆ V (y,m,b;qn)−V (y,m,b; ˆ q)]+V (y,m,b; ˆ q). By Step 2, limn ˆ c(y,m,b;qn) =
c(y,m,b; ˆ q). Hence limn[ˆ V (y,m,b;qn) − V (y,m,b; ˆ q)] = 0. Thus, liminfn V (y,m,b;qn) ≥
V (y,m,b; ˆ q). Next, observe that the second inequality implies V (y,m,b; ˆ q) ≥ [V n(y,m,b; ˆ q)−
V (y,m,b;qn)] + V (y,m,b;qn). By Step 2, limn cn(y,m,b; ˆ q) = c(y,m,b;qn). Therefore,
limn[V n(y,m,b; ˆ q) − V (y,m,b;qn)] = 0. Therefore V (y,m,b; ˆ q) ≥ limsupn V (y,m,b;qn).
Since limsup is at least as large as liminf, limsupn V (y,m,b;qn) = liminfn V (y,m,b;qn) =
V (y,m,b; ˆ q). Therefore limn V (y,m,b;qn) exists and is equal to V (y,m,b; ˆ q). Thus, V (y,m,b;q)
is continuous in q.
Deﬁne ˆ W(y,m;qn) as the utility under default from following the decision rules d(y,m,b; ˆ q)
and a(y,m,b; ˆ q) when the price function is qn. And deﬁne W n(y,m,b; ˆ q) as the utility
under repayment from following the decision rules d(y,m,b;qn) and a(y,m,b;qn) when the
price function is ˆ q. By Step 2, these constructs are well-deﬁned. The steps in the previous
paragraph can then be repeated to conclude that limn W(y,m;qn) = W(y,m; ˆ q).
Finally, Xy(b0;qn) = E(y0,m0|y) max{W(y0, ¯ m;qn),V (y0,m0,b0;qn)}. Continuity of W(y,m;q)














The functions max{W(y0, ¯ m;qn),V (y0,m0,b0;qn)} are non-negative and bounded above by



















41Therefore, limn Xy(b0;qn) = Xy(b0; ˆ q).
Step 4A (Convergence of a(y,m,b;qn)). Let qn → ˆ q. Fix y and b. For a given m, let b00 =
a(y,m,b; ˆ q). Let Vb0(y,m,b; ˆ q) denote the lifetime utility if the sovereign chooses to borrow
b0 in the current period but follows the optimal plan in all future periods. Two cases are
possible: (i) V (y,m,b; ˆ q) > Vb0(y,m,b; ˆ q) for all b0 6= b00 and (ii) V (y,m,b; ˆ q) = Vb0(y,m,b; ˆ q)
for some b0 6= b00. Consider case (i). Let V (y,m,b; ˆ q)−Vb0(y,m,b; ˆ q) = ∆. Since V (y,m,b;q)
is continuous in q there exists N1 such that for all n ≥ N1 V (y,m,b;qn) > V (y,m,b; ˆ q)−∆/2.
Next, note that Vb0(y,m,b;qn) = u(y − m + [λ + (1 − λ)z]b + qn(y,b0)[b0 − (1 − λ)b]) +
βXy(b0;qn). Since Xy(b0;q) is continuous in q it follows that there exists N2 such that for
all n ≥ N2 Vb0(y,m,b;qn) < Vb0(y,m,b; ˆ q)+∆/2. Therefore V (y,m,b;qn)−Vb0(y,m,b;qn) >
V (y,m,b; ˆ q)−∆/2−Vb0(y,m,b; ˆ q)−∆/2 = 0 for all n ≥ max{N1,N2}. Hence a(y,m,b;qn) =
b00 for all n > max{N1,N2}. Now consider case (ii). In this case, convergence may fail
because a(y,m,b;qn) may converge to b0 rather than b00. However, by Lemma 1 there can
be only a ﬁnite number of m values for which case (ii) can hold. Therefore, a(y,m,b;qn)
converge pointwise to a(y,m,b; ˆ q) except, possibly, for a ﬁnite number of m.
Step 4B (Convergence of d(y,m,b;qn)). Let qn → ˆ q. Fix y and b. Again, two cases
are possible. (i) W(y) 6= V (y,m,b; ˆ q) and (ii)W(y) = V (y,m,b; ˆ q). Consider case (i). For
concreteness, suppose that W(y)−V (y,m,b; ˆ q) = ∆ > 0. Then, by continuity of V (y,m,b;q)
there exists N such that for all n ≥ N, V (y,m,b;qn) < V (y,m,b; ˆ q) + ∆. For all such n,
W(y)−V (y,m,b;qn) > W(y)−V (y,m,b; ˆ q)−∆ = 0. Hence d(y,m,b;qn) = d(y,m,b; ˆ q) = 1
for all n ≥ N. If ∆ < 0 then there exists N such that for all n ≥ N, V (y,m,b;qn) >
V (y,m,b; ˆ q)+∆. For all such n, W(y)−V (y,m,b;qn) < W(y)−V (y,m,b; ˆ q)−∆ = 0. Hence
d(y,m,b;qn) = d(y,m,b; ˆ q) = 0 for all n ≥ N. Now consider case (ii). Again, convergence
may fail in this case because d(y,m,b;qn) may converge to 1 or 0 while d(y,m,b; ˆ q) is 0 or 1.
However, by Proposition 2, there can only be one value of m for this can happen. Therefore,
d(y,m,b;qn) converge pointwise to d(y,m,b; ˆ q) except, possibly, for one value of m. 
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